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Political economy is alive and well among those who seek to explain policy decision
making in developing and transitional countries.
1  That this is the case can be credited to the
assiduity of the “real world” in outdistancing our ability to explain politics.  During two decades
of extraordinary policy and institutional change, real world experiences consistently raised
intriguing and difficult-to-answer questions about the intersection of policies and politics: Why
would governments select and maintain policies that are demonstrably inefficient for economic
development?  Why do some governments choose to alter development policies and strategies in
significant ways while others maintain adherence to ones that are economically, socially, and
politically destructive?  Why are some reforming countries able to sustain new policies while
others are forced to abandon them?  How do institutions shape opportunities for reform?
Efforts to provide responses to these puzzles spawned a small industry of case studies and
cross-national analyses of the determinants of policy and institutional change in developing and
transitional countries.  As a result of such work, we know a great deal more about the political
economy of development policy, and particularly about when and why it is likely to change, than
we did twenty years ago.  We have extensive evidence about how powerful economic interests
develop around policies and the ways in which they resist reductions in the benefits they receive
from these policies.
2  We have gained significant insight into how to calculate the distributional
consequences of policy change.
3  We have seen considerable evidence that economic crises—
particularly crises associated with inflation, hyperinflation, and foreign exchange shortages—are
powerful stimuli for reform initiatives.
4  We have also learned, however, that crisis is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition to spur successful reform initiatives.
5  In other work,
researchers have shown us that opportunities to introduce new policies tend to cluster in so-
called honeymoon periods directly after elections.
6  Moreover, we have good reason to believe
that the actions of policy entrepreneurs and the character of technocratic teams are critical to the
success of reform initiatives.
7  In addition, we have gained greater appreciation for the role of
ideas and leadership in the process of change.
8  And we have begun to generate insights into why
new institutions are created and what their consequences are for the management of policy.
9
Luckily for the employment prospects of political economists, the real world continues to
provide interesting puzzles about development policy making.  And, usefully for scholarly
debate, there is considerable difference of opinion about the most appropriate way to go about
studying these puzzles.  In this paper, I consider some of the central debates in the application of
political economy to development policy making.
10  At the outset, I am particularly interested in
the insights that distinct traditions of political economy—some drawn from economics, others
based in sociological theory—generate about why and when change is likely to occur in policies
and institutions.  Subsequently, I consider whether such traditions provide effective guidance
about the politics of decision making and the process of policy reform and whether they generate
helpful insights for reformers interested in encouraging such processes.  Throughout this paper,2
then, I am concerned with the connection between theory, empirical observation, and the practice
of policy decision making.
I suggest that current approaches to political economy present a stark tradeoff between
parsimony and elegance on the one hand and insight into conflict and process on the other.  I also
find that both traditions of political economy borrow assumptions about political interactions
from contexts that may not be fully relevant to developing and transitional countries.  In
addition, when theory is compared to the extensive empirical literature that now exists about
experiences for policy and institutional change, it fails to provide convincing explanations for
some of the most important characteristics of real world politics—leadership, ideas, and success.
Further, much theoretical and empirical work in political economy has fallen far behind in
exploring the policy agendas that now confront developing and transitional countries.  I draw
modest conclusions from this survey of how political economists approach the issue of policy
choice and change, the ways in which theories model reality, and the research agenda for the
future:  political economists of whatever persuasion should consult the empirical world more
frequently, question assumptions more assiduously, stretch theory beyond overgeneralization or
overspecificity, and keep an eye open for the policy agendas of today and tomorrow as well as
those of yesterday.
In this paper, I have opted to understand political economy broadly to refer to efforts to
investigate the intersection of economics and politics in policy choice and in policy and
institutional change, whether these efforts reflect the “new political economy” rooted in
economics or a distinct tradition of analysis based in sociology.
11  For some in each tradition,
political economy means understanding how economic interests shape political behavior.  For
others, the central question is rather how political behavior shapes economic policy.  At the end
of the paper, I suggest an even broader arena for political economy in a series of policy issues
that go beyond traditional concerns with economic interests and economic policies to focus on
the reform of the state and the emergence of demands related to social policy.  My purpose in
doing so is to highlight some of the relatively unexplored territory in the real world that should
stimulate the interest and challenge the ingenuity of political economists.
Policy Choice and Change: Contending Paradigms
Currently, two broad traditions in political economy provide alternative ways of
understanding choices about policy and the factors that influence the adoption, implementation,
and consolidation of policy reform initiatives.
12  These approaches not only differ fundamentally
about the structure and meaning of competition over policy decisions, they also provide distinct
ways of understanding institutions and the relationship between institutions and actions.  In the
following pages, I describe traditions that draw on economics and sociology in attempting to
understand four real world puzzles: Why and when are politicians interested in supporting policy
change? How do political institutions affect the choices made by politicians? How are new
institutions created or transformed? and, What are the consequences of new rules of the game
for economic and political interaction?
The divide between political economists who draw on economic theory and those who
draw on sociological theory to explain policy is deep and often contentious.  Those who look to3
economics for insight into policy seek to develop a general theory of politics that is deductive,
powerful, and rigorous.
13  They are in search of explanations that hold across an extensive range
of empirical cases.  In contrast, those who draw on sociology insist that political behavior is
always deeply rooted in context and specificity and that to be useful, theory must be able to
evoke, explore, and explain this complexity and specificity.
14  They further insist that political
institutions are central to explaining why the study of policy is primarily a study of how similar
issues in collective life work out differently in distinct contexts.  These two approaches offer
strikingly different responses to questions about policy choice and change.  They also pose a
stark contrast in whether generality or specificity is the best way to understand political
dynamics.
Why and when are politicians interested in supporting policy change?
In the real world, politicians must initiate, support, or accept new policies if change is to
occur.  During the 1980s and 1990s, the support of politicians became critically important to
officials of international financial institutions and other policy advocates who were deeply
committed to encouraging major policy reforms.  Many times, however, they found that
politicians rejected reform proposals, even when these were clearly superior to a broken or
deeply inefficient status quo.  Other politicians embraced policy change and assumed active
leadership of efforts to introduce and sustain major innovations in national development
strategies.  Ongoing involvement with a series of reform initiatives provided sufficient evidence
that the desire to enhance social welfare, the suasion of technical analysis, or surrender to the
pressure of international agencies could not explain the diversity of responses to economic
stagnation and crisis afflicting countries around the world.
15
Some political economists turned to economics to understand the motivations of
politicians in resisting or embracing policy change.  Much of the ensuing effort drew on rational
choice theory.  The rational choice approach asserts that political actors, like homo economicus,
act to maximize utility, generally assumed to reflect their self-interest.  Voters, politicians,
lobbyists, bureaucrats, and party officials are understood to be rational in that they have
preferences and seek to achieve them through action.  Preferences are taken as given and, in
research, must be asserted ex ante, usually as a statement of reasonable first order objectives.
Thus, in seeking to explain the behavior of politicians, rational choice theorists generally assert
that politicians naturally prefer more power to less; survival in office to defeat; reelection to loss;
influence to irrelevance.  Voters naturally prefer politicians who provide benefits that improve
their individual welfare to those who do not.  Bureaucrats naturally prefer higher budgets to
lower ones, more discretion to less, more opportunities to promote their own welfare to fewer,
career promotion to demotion.  These individuals are distinct from economic actors only in that
they are conceptualized to be interacting in a political market in which competition is about
power to provide or receive benefits from public policy, public investments, and resources
controlled by government.
If politicians prefer power, survival in office, influence, and electoral support to not
having these things, then in democratic systems politicians must be particularly sensitive to the
interests of voters or particular constituencies that help them achieve their objectives.  The
interests of voters are particularly important in rational choice political economy because they4
constrain the choices available to politicians and compel them to make decisions that are
characteristically geared toward electoral gains.  Moreover, because of periodic elections,
politicians must discount the future heavily.  Thus, it is rational for politicians to sacrifice policy
choices that will pay off in the longer term to those that produce short-term advantages, like
staying in office.  In some cases, so powerful is the need of politicians to trade policy benefits for
votes that policy making can be captured by particular interests extorting preferential treatment
in return for votes or resources for electoral campaigns.
16  In such cases, the politicians and
particular interests are both engaged in rent-seeking.
Individuals are the unit of analysis in a rational choice approach to the explanation of
political behavior.  But because, empirically, much political activity involves the behavior of
groups, Mancur Olson and others have explained how and when self-interested individuals will
act collectively to achieve their policy goals.
17  They will do so when they can be assured that the
energy exerted by acting as a group will pay off efficiently in terms of individual benefits
received.  For reasons having to do with the potential for free-riders to benefit from group action
without expending the energy necessary to cooperate, groups tend to coalesce around very
specific interests that, if achieved, will not provide benefits to those outside the group.
Politically, this translates into the tendency for exchanges between politicians and a multitude of
interest groups, each of which is pursuing a narrowly focused and usually immediate benefit.
The task for the politician, then, becomes that of parceling out public policy or public resources
to a large number of competing groups, each of which has some capacity to punish the provider.
The larger purposes of government, such as "the public interest," are difficult to achieve, given
the exchange relationships between politicians and interests.
Given the orientation of rational choice theory, the approach offers at least two
hypotheses about why and when politicians would support policy change.  In one case,
politicians could make a rational strategic calculation that promoting policy reform would bring
them increased support at the ballot box; they could also choose to resist championing change
because of their rational expectation that doing so would diminish their chances of staying in
office.  An alternative hypothesis is somewhat different in that it would posit that the pressure of
particular interests is intense enough to give politicians no option but to support (or resist)
change; if they do not respond to the pressures, they will lose their jobs.
18  In the first case,
support of policy reform is a strategic option, in the second case, it is the result of lack of
options, given the preferences of politicians.
Comparative institutionalism, a broader and less theoretically rigorous tradition in social
science, provides a very distinct way of approaching the question of policy choice and change.
19
Drawing on sociology for analytic tools and on history for empirical insights, researchers who
follow this tradition view political actors as embedded within contexts that shape their behavior
in profound ways.  These contexts are far more than the strategic decision making arenas
described in rational choice theory.  They are complex environments that have roots in the past
and that not only constrain and channel action but actually shape the perspectives, preferences,
and values of the political actors.  Comparative institutionalists understand political actors to be
groups, classes, interests, or other collectivities.  While these are the primary units of analysis, it
is important that their behavior be analyzed and understood as an outcome of the complex and
historically evolved context within which they find themselves.  Thus, central to the tradition is5
the notion that events such as policy change are resultants of collectivities interacting within a
specific context.
In addition, comparative institutionalists place conflict at the center of political analysis
in ways that differ significantly from an economic perspective.
20  In rational choice theory,
conflict exists when two or more individuals simultaneously seek to act on their preferences, and
when these cannot be achieved through joint action.  Comparative institutionalists, in contrast,
view conflict as ongoing interactions through which groups compete for predominance in
particular economic, social, and policy arenas and in which prior conflicts shape the nature of
current conflicts and determine the issues that are contested.  Conflict over policy is the normal
stuff of politics, then, and outcomes are shaped by the relative power of distinct groups, a
condition that is itself determined by the outcomes of prior conflicts.
As a result of these premises, analysts who draw on the sociological tradition tend to
produce research that is rich in depth and complexity rather than in breadth and parsimony.
They are less interested in a general theory of politics than in understanding the conditions under
which political actors will behave in particular ways; they tend to generate middle range theory
and to be intensely engaged in understanding the historical record around particular conflicts.
Far more than is true of those who explain policy from a rational choice perspective, they are
concerned about institutions.  And, while they focus on the factors that shape the actions of
collectivities rather than on the logic of individual choice, they have also sought to understand
“statecraft.”
21  In pursuit of this goal, comparative institutionalists have studied the ways in
which individual political actors or political entrepreneurs maneuver within institutional contexts
to build coalitions, engineer consensus, negotiate, and bargain to generate new policies, new
legislation, and new institutions.
22  They find that some individuals are motivated to bring about
change while others resist it.  The motivations of these politicians can draw on ideas, collective
identities, group interests, and values as well as on self-interest.  Similarly, within this tradition,
some politicians are more skilled in the use of political resources, as well as having greater or
lesser access to these resources, than others.
In contrast to the hypotheses put forward by rational choice theorists, comparative
institutionalists offer much more contingent statements about why and when politicians will
initiate or support policy change.
23  The position taken will depend upon the nature of existing
and past conflicts over policy, the ways in which institutions privilege or discriminate against
particular individuals or groups, and the commitments and skills of the politicians who are
contending over policy.  Choices are not discrete, but are influenced by positions on other policy
matters and larger strategic issues that are important to the longer term concerns that divide and
unite groups in political conflict.  For political economists who draw on this tradition, much of
the story of policy choice and change can only be understood if institutions are properly taken
into consideration.
How do political institutions affect the choices made by politicians?
No one who has tried to untangle the web of day-by-day politics in any country can
ignore the ways in which policy decision makers are constrained by formal and informal rules of
the game for doing politics.  Decisions are affected by such institutions as party and electoral6
systems, formal allocations of power within government, legal systems, and informal norms
about how political debates are carried out. Who is entitled to make decisions is a consequence
of institutions that constrain and privilege various actors. What processes are mandated for
approving and implementing policies can determine their success or failure.  Who has access to
policy debates and how opposition is manifested are also determined by formal and informal
institutional arrangements that vary from country to country.  What electoral rules are in force
shape the ways in which political actors calculate the costs and benefits of various courses of
action.  In these and other ways, institutions shape the resources available to political actors and
the dynamics of policy choice.  Because institutions are complex and multifaceted, however,
analysts do not agree on how they shape the activities of politicians or the options available to
them.  Indeed, rational choice and comparative institutionalist approaches vary considerably in
terms of how they assess the role of institutions in policy choice.
While the rational choice approach is rooted in assumptions about the preferences of
generic individuals, it is not blind to the context in which political behavior occurs.  Context, in
terms of the particular constraints imposed by political institutions or incentive systems, shape
the opportunities available to political actors to pursue their preferences.
24  In this way,
politicians become strategic actors who accumulate information about the options available to
them and select actions that are most likely to allow them to maximize power, votes, influence,
or political survival within the political context that surrounds them.  From the perspective of
research, given assumptions about the preferences of political actors, knowledge of the context in
which they operate provides information necessary to explain and predict the policy choices they
make.  In seeking to provide generalizable statements about the political behavior of individuals,
rational choice theory deals with institutions as a strategic arena for individual choice.
Comparative institutionalists place institutions much more at the center of  explanations
of policy.  They insist that to understand political actors as generic individuals pursuing generic
preferences is to miss the role of institutions and history more generally in shaping the
preferences, orientations, values, and strategies of collective actors.  The nature and meaning of
conflict is similarly shaped by institutions, which channel and influence how conflict is played
out.  Thus, institutions are much more than contexts that inform rational strategic action.  For
comparative institutionalists, political actions are embedded in historically evolved institutions
which are, in turn, the site of on-going struggles to define public policy and distributions of
economic and political power.  In this way, institutions are determining factors in policy decision
making.  This perspective allows comparative institutionalists to explain how similar policy
problems—the provision of health care in modern industrial countries, for example—have
generated distinct solutions in different contexts.
25  They are results of the distinct institutional
environments that have shaped the goals and behaviors of groups and interests and have
determined how they contest for influence over policy.
Comparative institutionalists generally argue that political actions are shaped by
institutions, which in turn are shaped by the actions of political agents.  In fact, however, they
tend to focus much more on how actions are shaped by institutions than they do on the
transformative effect of action on institutions.  This reiterates quite realistically the dynamics of
everyday politics in most advanced industrialized countries, where much of the work in this
tradition has been carried out.  In such countries, political actions take place in relatively stable7
institutional settings.  Moreover, these institutions and the political actions they spawn are
understood to be embedded in the political system.
26  Embeddedness means that new institutions
are evolutionary descendants of older institutions, altered to accommodate new power
relationships or the consequences of conflicts over policy.  Thus, an important question for
political economy generally is the issue of institutional creation or evolution.
How are new institutions created or transformed?
Throughout much of the 1980s, many of those concerned about the prospects for
development of poor countries insisted on the importance of “getting the policies right.”  In
practice, however, while a number of countries were successful in getting the policies right, only
some of them were able to generate sustained economic growth.  Gradually, policy advisors and
policy makers came to the conclusion that the ability of new policies to generate improved
welfare depended on the kinds of institutions that were in place for managing economic and
political transactions.  This perspective was spurred by a number of analyses of the “East Asian
miracle” that pointed to the role of government institutions in paving the way for sustained
development.
27  In a very different way, it received considerable impetus from the early
experiences of post-communist countries that adopted a wide range of market-oriented policies
in the absence of formal and informal institutions for managing economic transactions.
28
Democratization, a struggle occurring in large numbers of countries around the world, called
attention to equally important rules of the game for political interactions.
29  Thus, creating or
transforming institutions of governance acquired increased importance as policy reformers
undertook initiatives to put in place autonomous central banks, independent tax authorities,
securities and exchange commissions, professional civil services, authoritative legal systems,
party and electoral systems, and other new institutions.  Analysts of these experiences sought
understanding about how such changes could occur.  They found that political economists had
more than one response for their questions.
Many working within the rational choices approach were particularly intrigued by the
creation of new institutions that constrained the power of politicians, such as the creation of
independent central banks and autonomous tax agencies. Given the assumptions of the theory,
how could this behavior be explained?  One answer invoked standard assumptions about the
preferences of politicians: if politicians are acting both rationally and strategically, they might
create new institutions that constrain their power over the longer term in order to achieve some
more immediate political advantage, such as winning an election, or they might be responding to
overwhelming pressure from electoral constituents.
More interesting responses focused on the relationship between new institutions and the
preferences of reformist politicians.  If politicians have supported policy reform, then they may
create new institutions to signal commitment to it or to lock in their choices against the capacity
of future incumbents to alter them.
30  In the first case, that of signaling commitment, the message
is aimed at domestic and international economic agents to convince them that the policy choices
made will remain stable, unaffected by the immediate electoral needs of (implicitly, other)
politicians.  In the second case, the target is future politicians who might seek to undo a set of
reforms and thus undermine the preferences of current incumbents.  The logic of these choices is
interesting: politicians prefer choices that constrain their power in the future to maximizing8
power in the present in order to reduce uncertainty about future choices, particularly those that
might be made by other politicians.  Thus, the creation of institutions that lock in policy
preferences can actually be understood as a way of maximizing individual preferences over the
longer term.
Despite these forays into explaining institutional creation, rational choice political
economists have been widely criticized for their failure to generate a broader understanding of
how institutional contexts emerge, persist, and change.  Led by Douglass North and others, a
"new institutionalist" perspective has sought to address this shortcoming.
31  New institutionalism
takes as a founding insight the idea that all exchanges involve transaction costs.
32  In economics,
transaction costs, such as acquiring information or enforcing rules, decrease the efficiency of
exchange relationships.  A critical insight in North’s approach is that institutions are not simply a
result of efforts to lower the transaction costs of market exchanges, but are also a function of
political and social interests and differences in the allocation of power in a society.  Thus,
institutions “are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; rather they, or at
least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to
devise the rules.  In a zero-transaction-cost world, bargaining strength does not affect the
efficiency of outcomes, but in a world of positive transaction costs it does....”
33  Institutional
change is promoted when actors with power perceive that their interests can be better achieved
through alternative sets of rules.
Extrapolating from this explanation, transaction costs also exist in political life and are
present in political exchanges such as those that occur between politicians and voters or
politicians and interest groups.  Politicians often do not have full information on the activities
and interests of important constituencies nor the time or ability to acquire such information.
They may also face conflicting demands from different interest constituencies.  Voters and
particular constituencies may not have full information on the behavior of the public officials
they want to respond to their concerns.  Nor do they necessarily know how many votes or how
much campaign money is efficient for getting what they want from the politicians.  Legislators
do not necessarily have information on the preferences of other legislators. The difficulty of
acquiring information such as this increases the risks of making choices for politicians, voters,
campaign contributors, and others.  To lower these transaction costs, implicit or explicit rules of
the game emerge that allow politicians and voters to act on the basis of incomplete information
without undue risk or without having to invest heavily in collecting information.
In this way, institutions such as electoral systems, political parties, and rules or
procedures in legislatures emerge over time to lower the transaction costs of doing politics.  At
the same time, these rules structure the interactions of citizens, politicians, and would-be
politicians by providing incentives and sanctions to behave in certain ways and by distributing
bargaining power differentially.  The behavior of political actors becomes predictable over time
as it conforms to these incentives, sanctions, and power relationships.  Moreover, these rules and
procedures structure the way other transaction costs problems are treated.  When such problems
emerge and, over time, generate pressures for changes or the introduction of greater stability in
how they are dealt with, legislation is introduced, debated, and voted upon according to the rules
that have evolved over time for dealing with legislation, debates, and votes.  As change occurs in9
the nature of transaction costs, the institutions themselves can evolve in ways that lower these
costs, although such a response is not always timely or efficient.
Over time, institutions accommodate to important changes in the nature of transactions,
such as those caused by technological innovation, the availability of information, and the
influence of other institutions (which are also evolving).  Over time also, history demonstrates
certain "path dependencies" that result from the way power relationships lock in distributional
biases.  Thus, the histories of different countries or different regions of the world are likely to
differ as each pursues a path that evolves from institutional adjustment and adaptation, producing
an economic theory that explains why “history matters.”  What North refers to as “discontinuous
change” occurs much less frequently and is generally a result of revolution or conquest.
“Although formal rules may change overnight as the result of political or judicial decisions,
informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions, and cultural constraints not only connect
the past with the present and future, but provide us with a key to explaining the path of historical
change.”
34
The new institutionalism of North and others is particularly concerned with explaining
institutional evolution and adaptation.  An “institutional design” approach provides an interesting
alternative for explaining institutional creation.  This approach is explicitly theoretical and non-
empirical in that it posits characteristic problems faced within organizations or institutions,
typically of a principal-agent nature, and seeks to develop rules and organizational principles that
allow for the efficient solution of these problems.
35  Principal-agent problems are found
everywhere in political life--in the relationship between the voter and the representative, the
politician and the bureaucrat, the bureaucratic superior and subordinate, the policy maker and the
implementer.  The essential problem is that the principal—in these cases, the voter, the
politician, the bureaucratic superior, and the policy maker—does not have sufficient information
or control over the actions of the agent—the representative, the bureaucrat, the subordinate, and
the implementer—to ensure that his or her commands are actually being carried out.  This creates
a problem of moral hazard for the principals in that they cannot be certain about the motivations
or actions of those entrusted with carrying out their promises or wishes.
The task for institutional design, then, is to find ways to structure this difficult
relationship to minimize the principal-agent problem.  Characteristically, work in this field
focuses attention on the incentive structures that surround the actions of agents.  That is, it is
concerned with ensuring that agents have incentives that encourage them to be attentive to the
wishes of the principals and efficient in responding to them.  In solving principal-agent
problems, the institutional designer asks: How can rules, procedures, and incentive structures be
created that ensure that agents commit to the goals of the principal?  Often, the issue is posed in
terms of the principal’s desire to ensure future commitment to particular policy or institutional
preferences.
Approaching the issue of institutional creation through an institutional design perspective
is intriguing because it suggests that history and process are not important nor is path
dependence a constraint.  With this perspective, explaining the creation of new institutions at
particular moments becomes that of demonstrating how political actors self-consciously design
new rules of the game through a technical process of analysis, much as an engineer would10
analyze a particular problem relating to say, weight bearing capacity, and then design a structure
that solves the particular problem.  Indeed, the “reengineering” approach to organizational
change is based on similar assumptions and the reorganization of New Zealand’s public sector in
the 1990s was significantly influenced by such a design experience.
36  This approach suggests
that new institutions are created because a group of institutional designers sits around a
metaphorical table, identifies a set of on-going principal-agent problems to be solved, self-
consciously designs new ways to resolve them, and then puts them into effect.  In a recent study
of “democratizing reforms” in three countries, I found such institutional designers playing
critical roles in each case.
37
Comparative institutionalists would balk at such an apolitical explanation of institutional
change.  They would wonder about what drove the institutional designers to the table in the first
place and what authorization they had to solve the problems they identified.  They would argue
that such a rational problem-solving explanation cannot explain away conflict over goals and the
allocation of power.  They would argue instead that conflicts and differences in the power of
collectivities can result in new rules being negotiated or imposed on society.  New rules thus
emerge out of past conflicts and past structures of power.  Comparative institutionalism thus
suggests that new institutions come into being as a result of historically embedded conflicts
about the distribution of power and benefits in a society and can be understood as negotiated or
imposed resultants of contestation among interests.
38  They might or might not deal with
transaction costs or principal agent problems, but only as contingent outcomes of conflicts over
power.
What are the consequences of new rules of the game for politics?
When new institutions are created and take on reality, they introduce new rules and new
incentives into decision making.  When put into practice, they can alter long-existing power
relationships, introduce new sources of conflict, resolve some long-standing problems, or alter
the motivations of political actors in important ways.  Thus, the story of institutional creation is
incomplete unless it also addresses the consequences of new rules of the game for political actors
and policy decision making.  Again, distinct political economy approaches provide very different
responses to this puzzle.
A rational choice explanation of the consequences of introducing new institutions would
anticipate that a new set of constraints on the options available to politicians would lead to new
strategies for achieving first order preferences.  Politicians would have to adjust to new
constraints in their efforts to maximize power, survive in office, or win elections.  Thus, given
institutional change, political actors will select politicies that are rational in terms of their
predictable preferences for more power rather than less, more electoral advantage rather than
less, more career stability rather than less, and so forth.  Rational choice theorists would thus
anticipate a new equilibrium in policy decision making, reintroducing stable expectations about
rational behavior.
If, as in the new institutionalism, rules of the game are created in response to transaction
costs problems in politics, then it can be predicted that new institutions will lower the costs of
doing politics.  The task for empirical research would be to focus on the extent to which this is11
true.  Even in cases in which institutional disjuncture occurs, it could be predicted that path
dependence would reassert itself as an explanation for the subsequent evolution of institutions.
Presumably, new institutions eventually experience the accumulation of transaction costs
problems and then the further evolution of the institution or its rupture through the creation of a
new institution.  The institutional design literature offers a similarly interesting hypothesis:  if
new institutions are created with an eye toward resolving principal-agent problems, then we
should anticipate that they will create more accountability in the sense of ensuring a closer link
between what principals want and what agents do.
A comparative institutionalist assessing the consequences of the creation of new
institutions would explore a more dynamic hypothesis about change.  In distinction to the
equilibrium situation predicted in economic models, a sociological approach would anticipate
that institutional change would create new sources of conflict, new claims for resources, new
spaces for contestation, or efforts by various collectivities to undo the impact of the new
institutions on their claims to power and influence.  It would also encourage research on new
political actors—whether these are collectivities, their leaders, or those who benefited or lost
from the redistribution of power and access to benefits—and new ways of organizing for
political contestation.  Political actors would reorganize, recombine, or reassert themselves to
take advantage of new resources or reclaim lost ones; they would re-connect in conflict, coalition
building, and bargaining over the distributional consequences of change, probably with
reconfigured access to political, economic, and leadership resources.
Different strokes for different folks?
Two distinct theoretical traditions provide important contrasts in terms of how they
explore and explain policy decision making and policy and institutional change.  The purpose of
theory building, levels of analysis, assumptions about the nature of politics, and methods of
inquiry differ significantly between the two.  In recent years, adherents of both traditions have
been outspokenly harsh about the other.  Those who favor the elegance and parsimony of
economic models of political behavior accuse comparative institutionalists of avoiding rigorous
theory and scientific methodology and of producing primarily descriptive studies.
39  Those who
work from within the sociological tradition retort that economic models produce political
banalities and historically inaccurate analyses that ignore empirical evidence.
40  Acrimony as
well as very distinct basic assumptions makes talking across this divide in political economy
increasingly difficult.  Indeed, it is rare to find scholars working in either tradition
acknowledging the work of the other.
The purpose of this section has not been to choose up sides in this debate, however.  It
has been, rather, to lay out how distinct visions of political economy deal with central questions
of policy decision making.  Having done so, it is time to consider whether the theoretical lenses
of the economic and sociological traditions are helpful in providing insight into what we know
about policy making and policy and institutional change in developing and transitional countries.
This comes somewhat closer to choosing up sides.  As the next section suggests, however,
holding theory up to the mirror of empirical studies to ask how usefully theory models reality
finds both schools of political economy deficient in important ways.12
When Theory Meets Practice
To be relevant in the real world, political economy theory ought to be useful in at least
one of two ways.  It ought to be able to model reality by reflecting basic dynamics of political
interactions in the design and implementation of development policy and in the creation or
transformation of institutions.  If it can do this, it can inform the political strategies of those
actively engaged in promoting policy and institutional change.  Additionally or alternatively,
theory ought to be able to predict the behavior of political agents in designing, adopting, and
implementing policy change or predicting the political consequences of alternative policy and
institutional choices.  This is another way of informing the strategic choices that policy reformers
make.
Of course, theory does not necessarily need to be relevant to the real world.  Its objective
can be to provide added insight into generic questions about cause and effect relationships, to
provide frameworks for thinking about issues in ways that add to our understanding of them, to
provide elegant statements of logical deduction, or to predict outcomes given certain
assumptions. At the level of theory, it may not matter if underlying assumptions of political
economy approaches are inadequate or wrong if the logic of the argument is rigorous and
parsimonious, if the modeling is elegant, or if the ideas advanced are novel and interesting.
At the same time, the field of development has long sought be bridge the gap between
theory and the real world in efforts to understand the policies and strategies that can best lead to
improvements in welfare in developing, and now transitional, countries.  Just as insistently, it has
sought to apply the insights of theory to advice about what policies developing and transitional
countries ought to adopt.  Considering how such advice is filtered through political and decision
making contexts to inform strategic action is merely an extension of this long-existing concern to
link theory to practice.  Political economy analyses should be able to feed back into helpful ideas
about what might be done to improve practice.  If it identifies inappropriate dynamics about why
reform is initiated, who the principal actors are, and what conditions characterize the institutions
within which decisions are made, advice is likely to be unrealistic or misleading.  In
consequence, it is appropriate to ask how well different political economy approaches model
characteristic features of politics in developing and transitional countries, and how well they
account for characteristic features of policy reform efforts in those same countries.
Imagining reality
The political economy traditions of interest here emerged primarily through scholarship
in and on advanced industrial countries.  Economic approaches have been most frequently
advanced in the United States.  European scholars have been much more frequently drawn to
sociological theory for understanding politics, although the tradition is strong in the United
States also.  Inadvertently, perhaps, their origins show through in the underlying assumptions
they hold about the normal behavior of political actors and the characteristics of political
institutions.  Both traditions tend to view politics as society-centric, in the sense that initiative for
action, including policy change, emerges from parties, interest groups, public opinion, or other
mechanisms in civil society.  This assumption may not necessarily hold for characteristic aspects13
of politics in developing and transitional countries, where politics has much more often been
state-centric, reflecting the actions of elites within government rather than the pressures of civil
society on government or on political officials.
41  With democratization in many countries, this
tradition is undergoing change, yet it remains the case in many countries that policy decision
making is carried out in relatively closed contexts.  In addition, politics often occurs in unstable
institutional settings, a condition that differs significantly from the institutional environments of
developed countries.
Assumptions that conform to basic conditions of politics in the United States underlie
much of the work that derives from economics.  Typically, for example, such approaches assume
that voters are sovereign and that votes are meaningful in the sense that they unambiguously
decide outcomes.  Further, political parties are generally considered to be non-programmatic and
decentralized, to be electoral organizations that mobilize voters around periodic elections, and to
be few in number.  Similarly, it is assumed that politicians can be reelected and that they face
frequent electoral contests.  In addition, interest groups are assumed to be concerned with single
issues, government to be highly porous to interest group pressure, politicians and political
leaders to be reactive to pressure rather than the initiators of policy agendas, and the power of
political executives to be highly circumscribed by the power of other institutions, such as
legislatures.  Perhaps most important, politics is considered to be played out in stable
institutional environments in which past behavior provides a template for predicting current and
future behavior.
Assumptions about normal politics in comparative institutionalism are more diverse, but
certainly much of the orientation of the approach is most comfortable in European contexts.  In
this perspective, the most important identities of those who engage in political conflict are class-
based or derive from structural conditions of the economic and political systems.  Parties, which
tend to be few, provide important ideological and programmatic foundations for their
membership and thus are often movement or membership organizations rather than electoral
parties.  As such, they embrace and define their adherents more fully than is true of electoral
parties.  It is normally assumed that politicians represent group interests and are accountable to
those interests for programmatic commitments.  History and structure matter deeply in that the
legacies of past conflict and relationships emerge in current conflict.  As a consequence,
continuities are more likely than disjunctures in politics and positions on policy issues.
Institutions are stable and evolve over time.  Conflict is the normal stuff of day-to-day politics
and negotiation over issues is endemic.
Both images of politics miss important features of politics in developing countries.
Among these are that voters are not necessarily sovereign but are often nodes in long chains of
clientelistic relationships controlled by political bosses.  Moreover, votes often ratify decisions
already taken, compete with other ways of deciding outcomes—such as the use of force—or are
in other ways peripheral to deciding outcomes.  Parties tend to be highly centralized and often
they are ephemeral.  Some systems have only one party and others have numerous parties that
contest for positions of influence in government.  Winning elections often represents
extraordinary opportunities for patronage and spoils, and change in government can be
extensively reflected in the public service and the public purse and in conflict over the rules of
the game.  Politicians may be barred from reelection to the same position.  Interest groups can be14
powerful but organizationally inchoate.  Government is often highly centralized and closed to
formal lobbying while at the same time very porous to informal relationships of influence or
public displays of power, such as strikes, protest marches, and even violence.  As indicated,
politics is frequently state-centric in that high level politicians initiate policy and have extensive
formal and informal power.  In addition, policy is frequently approved without the intent of
putting it into practice, thus playing havoc with the interpretation of official pronouncements.
Negotiation is one form of conflict resolution, but it is frequently joined by confrontation,
coercion, and winner-take-all faits accomplis.  In large numbers of cases, institutions are unstable
and are changed frequently.  Even the basic rules of the game for how politics is to be carried on
can change radically and frequently, such as when regimes are overthrown or when new
constitutions are introduced.
What happens, then, when theoretical lenses are focused on instances of policy decision
making and policy and institutional change in these unstable institutional contexts?  The inherent
power of the rational choice model, based on the simplicity of its assumptions and its deductive
logic, can easily lead to research that is logically compelling but empirically false—and thus
unhelpful.  For example, it can encourage students of political economy to focus on the behavior
of individuals, groups, and institutions as if they mattered, when in fact they may be peripheral to
the dynamics of real world policy and institutional choice and change.  In many parts of the
world, for example, legislatures are peripheral to policy decision making.  Yet political
economists of this tradition have at times chosen to study them as if they were powerful
influences in this process, in part because legislative voting data can be readily used to test
hypotheses and, more fundamentally, because of inappropriate assumptions about the importance
of legislatures in the policy process.
42  Moreover, the approach emphasizes the society-centric
origin of pressure for policy change.  It thus tends to reason forward from interests (given
particular interests, groups will press for particular kinds of policies) or backward from outcomes
(if certain interests benefit from policy, they must have been central to influencing policy
choices).
43  In either case, process is treated as a black box and the question of who takes the
initiative to promote policy and institutional change is assumed rather than investigated.
Process, however, is extremely important if the purpose of political research is to improve
decision making about policy.
Despite its origins, comparative institutionalism has generally shown itself to be more
adaptive to the realities of developing and transitional country policy making.  This tradition is,
in fact, more inductive and empirical in its practice and, given its sensitivity to the importance of
the particularities of context, is more geared to unfolding the particularities of cases.  It is also an
approach that, given its interest in investigating conflict and how it plays out, is able to focus
analytic attention on process.  As a fairly open-ended framework of analysis, it invites
investigation of a broad range of issues and questions, constrained only by the tendency to see
groups, conflict, and contextual peculiarities behind every bush.  As we have seen, however, the
approach tends to inhibit generalization.  Outcomes are highly contingent and, while the
approach is rich in the ability to reconstruct, describe, and analyze what has happened, it eschews
the capacity to predict what will or might happen.  Moreover, it tends to emphasize pressures for
change that are located in social groups and movements rather than allowing for the possibility
of a more state-centric view of process.15
Underexplaining reality
Case studies of the political economy of policy decision making regularly point to
important determinants of outcomes that are not fully considered in either political economy
tradition.  At least three factors appear to be underexplained.  First, leadership consistently plays
an important role in reform situations but continues to be largely exogenous to theory.  Similarly,
ideas—particularly ideas about the appropriate content of development policies—emerge as
important factors in case study research and have been shown to have important connections to
power relationships.  Theory has little to say about ideas, however.  Third, the real world is full
of examples of the successful introduction of reformed policies and improved institutions.
Theory, however, overdetermines resistance, stasis, and failure.
Leadership.  Leadership matters in reform initiatives.  It matters in terms of the timing of
reform initiatives, the content of reform proposals, and the process of generating support and
managing opposition to change.  Studies of policy reform initiatives indicate that for successful
change, reform leaders must emerge, commit themselves to the content of a reform, empower
and protect technocrats who provide substantive input into reform planning, mobilize reformist
coalitions, provide a vision of a more hopeful future to help citizens tolerate the disequilibrium
of change, and deal effectively with those whose opposition threatens to derail reform.
44 In fact,
the empirical literature is almost unanimous: reform leadership is essential to successful policy
and institutional change.
In political economy theory, however, leadership is not well explained.  Both economic
and sociological traditions are uncomfortable with the notion of agency in history.  Despite
considerable evidence that individuals can make a difference to the destinies of countries, this
evidence fits poorly with the desire to identify generic rationales for human behavior or to
analyze how institutional structures and rules constrain behavior.  Moreover, because the issue of
leadership is difficult to pin down, academics have tended to observe it and then to underexplain
its implications for both theory and analysis.  Nevertheless, policy reform initiatives may be one
area in which individuals can make a difference to the outcome of history.
 Political economy approaches that draw on economics for insight into human behavior
anticipate reform leadership only when such action can be clearly linked to political self-interest.
For example, sponsorship of policy change can be expected when it will result in electoral
advantage or when politicians are forced to accede to the wishes of powerful interests whose
support is necessary to remain in office.  The empirical record of many policy changes put in
place in the 1980s and 1990s fit uncomfortably with this logic, however.  In cases of policies for
stabilization and structural adjustment, and unless politicians are attempting to control very high
levels of inflation, widespread opposition generally meets proposals for policy change.  This
opposition is normal because, as pointed out by political economists from this tradition, potential
losers from altered policy tend to be well organized and conscious of the losses they face while
winners tend to be dispersed and generally unaware of the benefits of reform.
45
Given that many politicians in developing countries are constitutionally barred from re-
election, political economists have posed another motive, that of keeping a political party in
office.  But this hypothesis is also suspect in light of considerable evidence that reform leaders16
often act against the wishes of their political parties and support reforms that impose costs on
their traditional support bases.
46  Indeed, reformist leaders consistently act in the absence of a
preexisting coalition of support and often in the face of overwhelming opposition from powerful
groups in the population.
47  In fact, one of their critical roles is to identify and mobilize a reform
coalition in the absence of any powerful constituency for it.  Empirical studies also demonstrate
consistently that politicians who are forced unwillingly into reform by powerful international
actors renege on their agreements.
48  In many cases, then, leaders appear to act autonomously
from the stated preferences of powerful groups and even against their own immediate political
self-interest.
49
The new institutionalism is largely silent on the issue of agency.  The model, for
example, does not specify actors.  Institutions evolve naturally over time to deal with transaction
costs; but in the real world, particular actors take particular decisions that cause change to
happen.  Thus, it would be interesting to consider how transaction costs are identified, who they
accrue to, how affected interests behave, who takes the initiative for change, and so forth.
50  A
more difficult problem is that of predicting whether transaction costs are in fact lowered in
something as complex as a political market.  In a recent study, I found that new political
institutions raised transaction costs for some actors, lowered them for others, and made no
difference to yet others.  It was similarly difficult to determine if politics more generally was
proceeding more efficiently in the wake of change.
51
Comparative institutionalism fares somewhat better in providing insight into the
leadership roles of reform politicians.  In this approach, the issue of why politicians behave as
they do is an empirical question and need not be asserted ex ante, as in rational choice
approaches.  Traditionally, also, comparative institutionalism has recognized the importance of
statecraft in its research agenda.  Leaders are generally not accorded much autonomy, however.
Given the basis of the approach in assumptions about the role of collectivities and conflict,
leadership is usually treated as a function of group interests and resources for engaging in
conflict over policy and institutional preferences.  Thus, leaders are those who represent and
advance group interests in conflicts.  At the same time, leaders can be counted as resources that
groups have—or don’t have—in their quest for policy results.  This would be the case in
demonstrating, for example, that some groups or interests have leadership skilled in negotiation
and some don’t, some have leaders in powerful official positions and others don’t, and so forth.
The notion that leaders act more autonomously in the sense that they initiate proposals and
mobilize group support around particular policy issues is elusive in the theory, although it
appears to be a normal case in practice.
The issue of reform leadership, then, emerges strongly in empirical literature but is
underdetermined in theory.  Nevertheless, generating greater understanding of reform leadership
will be a difficult challenge for any theory.  Indeed, based on a wide range of case studies on
policy reform, it is tempting to conclude that leadership is idiosyncratic.  If this is the case, it
could only be studied on a case by case basis.  It could be useful, however, to devote time to
exploring how leaders emerge, what basis they claim for exerting leadership, what particular
political tasks they must perform, and what strategies they select to promote reform in particular
contexts. One interesting insight of the case study literature is that leaders often invoke ideas as17
reasons for championing reform and as ways of mobilizing support for it.  Thus, leadership and
ideas may need to be explored jointly.
Ideas and power.  Ideas matter in reform initiatives.  Ideas appear to play an important
role in how problems are interpreted and how options to deal with those problems are selected
and assessed.
52  In the past two decades, for example, neoclassical economics has had a
significant impact on the development of policy in a very wide range of countries.  In a typical
case, reformers are convinced that their country is in economic stagnation or crisis because of
development policies that accorded a leading role to the state in economic development.  They
believe that the country must liberalize markets and international trade and diminish the size and
role of the state to allow more scope for markets to function well.  They champion reform
because they believe in the superiority of markets to states in the process of development.  These
reformers have often had important educational experiences that convinced them of the rightness
of neoclassical economics and/or they are part of transnational networks of practitioners who
speak a common language of ideas.
53  Not infrequently, leaders of reform initiatives act on the
basis of ideas that directly contradict ideas they claimed in the past.
54
Understanding the role of ideas in policy reform initiatives is important because of the
link between ideas and power.  Those who have found ideas to be important ingredients of the
reform situations they study are often implicitly or explicitly arguing that expertise affects the
distribution of power in the reform process.  For example, one of the more interesting insights to
emerge from early case studies of economic policy reform was the central role that technocratic
teams played in crafting reform initiatives.
55  Disciplinary training, particularly in economics,
underlay the way in which such teams understood national economic problems and the language
they used to communicate about these problems among themselves, with influential policy
makers, and with international actors.  Although the power of the technocrats was derivative of
their relationship to political leaders, they frequently filled seats at the policy table that had
previously been occupied by representatives of interest groups, economic elites, party officials,
or heads of line ministries.
56  In a very direct way, then, ideas reshaped power relationships in
many policy decision making situations.  Similarly, ideas became explicitly political resources as
policy entrepreneurs used them to bring people together around reformist agendas, to put
together broad new reform coalitions, and to define issues in conflict situations.
Implicitly, many international actors promote policy change as if ideas matter.
International financial institutions, for example, put money into research and training for their
own staff and also for those who are or might be engaged in policy discussions.  They promote
policy dialogue and consensus building based on discussions of ideas about, for example, how
economies work most efficiently.  They engage with technocrats in the countries they deal with
and help generate national development strategies that owe much to current understanding of
how market economies are developed and sustained.  Thus, ideas may be one important means
through which international actors become players in domestic policy debates.
In political economy theory, however, ideas generally get short shrift, overshadowed by
focus on the economic interests of political actors.  In economic approaches, with the exception
of institutional design, ideas are not treated seriously.  The normal case is one in which
politicians and others make decisions based on self-interested logic that leaves no room for18
attributing influence to ideas.  In the comparative institutionalist literature, ideas are
acknowledged to have a role in group consciousness and both inter- and intra-group conflict.
Ideas thus help groups understand their own situation or define their identity and interests in
distinction to those of others.  They can be the fault lines along which conflict occurs.  In some
cases, of course, ideas are treated primarily as consciously adopted window dressing for the
promotion of economic interests.
57  Most commonly, ideas are understood as political resources,
a form of capital that is used to promote particular positions or to influence the outcome of
decisions.  In neither approach is there much attention to how political actors take on
commitments to ideas, how ideas can be distinguished from interests, or the way ideas about how
to solve particular problems become the dominant language of policy discussion.
Of course, as with the concept of leadership, there is good reason for theoretical caution
when dealing with the issue of ideas.  Ideas are difficult to track and measure and to separate
from interests.  The influence of ideas must be inferred from the statements and policy
preferences of actors.  It is almost always a conundrum to know how much individuals or groups
are acting out of conviction or out of some more self-interested motivation.  Only in cases in
which actors assert and act on ideas that are in direct conflict with their immediate and longer-
term self-interest can a good case be made for the independent influence of ideas.  In practice,
the impact of ideas in policy reform situations is frequently asserted but rarely is it possible to
provide fully convincing proof that ideas explain policy choices.  Nevertheless, given the
frequency with which ideas emerge in experiences of reform, it is a concept that deserves more
attention in political economy theory.
Success.   In surveying the policy history of countries around the world in the past 20
years, the extent of change is remarkable.  While countries have moved at different speeds and
with varying degrees of completeness, the vast majority of countries have, by 1999, adopted
market-oriented economic development strategies and have moved far in the direction of trade
liberalization, privatization, and government retrenchment and reorientation.  The rapid pace of
economic globalization has certainly pushed many governments in this direction, but historical
memories should remind us how far so many countries have come in the past twenty years.
Whatever the forces at work, each of these countries has had to devise new policies, find political
support for them, put them in practice—often through the creation of new institutions—and work
to sustain them over time.  This represents an extensive record of success in initiating and
implementing reform.
Meanwhile, political economy theory continues to predict failure in efforts to promote
policy and institutional change.  The larger the change, the more theory would anticipate
resistance and reaction rather than successful adaptation.
58  In many ways, current political
economy approaches begin and end in agreement with Machiavelli’s pronouncement, written in
1513:
It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful
of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things.  For the
reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm
defenders in all those who would profit from the new order, this lukewarmness arising
partly from the fear of their adversaries, who have the laws in their favor; and partly from19
the incredulity of mankind, who do not truly believe in anything new until they have had
the experience of it.
Notwithstanding growing evidence of the adoption of significant policy changes, theory
continues to approach the politics of reform by anticipating factors that are likely to inhibit it.
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The reasons for this focus are both empirical and theoretical.  Empirically, it is true that
in most cases, reform does threaten important or broad interests and imposes costs that have real
meaning in the calculations of politicians.  Thus, success often occurs despite Machiavelli’s
warning.  More to the point of theory, however, failure in policy reform initiatives may be
overdetermined because both economic and sociological approaches to political economy begin
with a concept of individuals or groups acting within contexts that limit action and initiative.
Constraints come in the guise of negatively affected interests, the machinations of other
politicians, or the political institutions that limit the power of reformers.  As indicated, these
factors are all important and usually are empirically identifiable.  The problem is not whether
constraints exist or not, it is rather that an initial concern for identifying constraints tends to bias
researchers to focus on why reform won’t fly.  Thus, most begin with a conservative bias in
considering likely outcomes of reform efforts.
For example, a general theory of politics, the objective of political economy rooted in
economics, is a theory about politics understood generally, concerned with explaining what is
likely to happen most frequently or most of the time.  As indicated, it is most appropriate in
stable institutional contexts in which the objective is to explain the behavior of the generic
politician, voter, bureaucrat, or interest group member.  Such an approach, then, may fail to
anticipate the kinds of choices that can make a real difference in political life.  Although it takes
individuals as the unit of analysis, the approach can be faulted for not taking individuals
seriously enough, in the sense that individuals can be agents of history and not simply captives of
the “games” that are in play.
Moreover, in the economics-based political economy literature, politics is treated as a
negative input into policy decision making.  In this approach, the politics of self-interest distort
policy choice so that general purposes and social welfare objectives become lost in efforts to
pursue narrow individual and group interests.  The logical consequence of this orientation is that
resultant policies are likely to be ones that are socially and economically irrational, even though
they serve the interests of identifiable individuals and groups.  Again, the bias is toward
anticipating socially unproductive policies.  It is, however, possible to view politics through
more neutral lenses and to understand policy makers as “strategic managers within complex
policy contexts who have a set of complex preferences and who are seeking politically,
bureaucratically, and economically viable outcomes.”
60  Viewed in this way, the outcome of a
process of decision making could be good, bad, or indifferent with regard to change in policies or
institutions.  A more process oriented approach to understanding policy decision making
illuminates more fully the fact that contexts offer both constraints and opportunities for change
and that good analysis demonstrates not only how constraints will be felt but also how
opportunities can be identified and acted upon.20
A process oriented approach also draws more attention to the fact that the power of
particular individuals or groups can fluctuate considerably over time and alter the dynamics of
politics in important ways.  Again, particularly in economic approaches, interests are treated as
fixed in terms of their positions of power and in the preferences they have.  But it is useful to
remember that part of the reason many macroeconomic reform packages were introduced
without greater resistance was that in many countries, the power of unions and import
substituting interests had declined considerably under the impact of the global recession and
domestic economic crisis of the early 1980s.  Static concepts of power cannot explain why what
appears to be a constraint one day becomes an opportunity the next.  Theory needs to attempt to
capture more fully the dynamic interactions that surround policy decision making and the
dynamics of change over time in the power and interests of political actors.
Conclusion: Agendas for Political Economy and Policy Reform
In the past decade or more, real world initiatives for change have been ahead—often far
ahead—of what political economists have chosen to study.  In fact, most work on the political
economy of development policy making remains focused on the factors that affect decision
making about stabilization and structural adjustment, the so-called first generation reforms.  Yet
a quick visit to many countries in the world today is sufficient to note that the development
policy agenda is long on other issues.  In many countries, the policies promoted to engender a
sound market-oriented economy are accepted as necessary and the political economy
surrounding their adoption and sustainability has become less crisis-ridden.  Of course, the Asian
financial crisis has reintroduced issues related to macroeconomic management in the context of
volatility in international capital markets and these remain as critically important concerns on the
table for policy discussion and debate.  In addition, considerable work on international
institutions and policy regimes that increasingly influence the domestic politics of developing
and transitional countries is illuminating important political economy issues.  Among these are
the conditions under which such institutions influence decision making, the ways in which
international and domestic actors form alliances to affect domestic policies, the range of options
available to countries to manage globalization in institutions and policy regimes, and
explanations for the choices they make.  At the same time, other issues have crowded onto the
table, and they have received much less attention from political economists than they warrant.
More specifically, political economists need to devote more attention to issues of
institutional change.  While there is an evolving literature on the political economy of
institutional creation and change in terms of those that are important for economic
management—central banks, tax agencies, ministries of finance—there remains much work to be
done in terms of the reform of the state more generally, including decentralization, civil service
reform, and capacity building.  Political economists need to consider where the initiative for
institutional change comes from, how new institutional models are generated, the way in which
the dynamics of institutional creation may differ from those of institutional evolution, and how
political and economic actors adapt to such changes.
Similarly, one of the most important policy issues on the table at present is improvement
in the quality and reach of social policies and their impact on poverty alleviation.  Political
economists should be challenged to explore how and why the politics of social policy reform21
differ from the experiences of first generation reform, how new structures and incentive systems
affect bureaucratic behavior in social service delivery organizations, the distributional
consequences of alternative social policies and delivery systems, and the impact of alternative
models on poverty alleviation.
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Equally important issues surround a wealth of real world experiments with political
reform around the world.  Recently empowered local governments, efforts to incorporate
participation by civil society in policy decision making—such as participatory budgeting—the
creation of offices of ombudsmen and national consumer protection agencies, the reform of
judicial systems, the emergence of new political parties, and mechanisms to bring greater
accountability and transparency to public affairs are among the innovations that hold the
potential to alter political dynamics in important ways.  Political economists ought to be studying
these phenomena and seeking to stretch theoretical models to provide useful insights into what
political interactions bring them into being and what consequences they have for the way politics
get done.
If theory seems stuck on understanding the political roots and implications of
stabilization and structural adjustment while the agenda for development in the real world has
expanded far beyond this focus, the agenda for political economists is a challenging one in the
future.  Despite the political turmoil they involve, the kinds of changes made through first
generation reforms are relatively simple in terms of political interactions.  In the typical case,
political leaders initiate proposals for change, empower technocratic teams to design reform
programs, negotiate at high levels with international financial agencies, and centralize power in
the executive branch to facilitate decision making, which is often carried out in secret among a
relatively small group of officials.  Many macroeconomic reforms do not require extensive
implementation.  So-called “stroke of the pen” reforms—deregulation is a good example—call
on governments to desist from doing things, thus avoiding issues of institutional capacity and the
management of implementation.  Decisions are difficult to make because of the political costs
they impose, but once made, they are relatively easy to carry out.
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While this is a highly stylized portrait of what has occurred in adopting and implementing
first generation reforms, and it does not hold for more complex tasks such as privatization and
regulation, the experience of such policy changes stands in considerable contrast to efforts to
build credible and capable new institutions, promote important reforms in health and education
services and in social security and labor policy, and create more decentralized and participatory
forms of governance.
63  These activities involve many more moving parts in terms of how they
are planned and put in practice.  They also require extensive consultation, negotiation, and
consensus building if they are to be successfully adopted.  They call for decentralized forms of
decision making and need on-going and time-consuming monitoring and capacity building if
they are to be implemented.  In contrast to the general consensus that exists about
macroeconomic policy, many of the newer reforms do not have well-recognized templates that
explain the central problem and the appropriate solution to it.
64  Policy makers are thus dealing in
much more complex political environments and often walking blind in terms of what needs to be
done to resolve issues of public importance.22
The politics involved in these second generation reforms are more complicated than those
of the earlier economic policy changes and appear to be very contingent on histories of conflict
and the structural characteristics of state-society relations in particular countries.  Yet these
complex policy and institutional changes may be as important to encouraging development as the
macroeconomic reforms already adopted.  They are important subjects for theory building and
analysis, even though they may require the development of new theoretical models and more
contingent explanations of change.  Given the number of policy makers and advisors struggling
with these issues currently, however, the quest to understand their political dynamics can be
directly useful in the real world, if not to provide answers, at least to suggest strategies for
improving the life chances of a wide variety of welfare-enhancing changes.23
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